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INTRODUCTION: FACEBOOK AND THE PREVALENCE OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA IN LITIGATION DISCOVERY 
When Facebook was first founded in 2004, few could have im-
agined its quick popularity, pervasive use, and cultural prevalence. 
It was perhaps even more difficult to conceive that Facebook, 
among other social media networks, would ultimately become a 
common and increasingly widespread part of litigation discovery 
proceedings. However, courts, counsel, and adversarial parties 
quickly realized that, because “an overwhelming majority of adults 
online . . . use social networking sites,”1 there is a wealth of infor-
mation to be found by incorporating social media into traditional 
discovery requests. Today, there are over 1.19 billion active Face-
book users, and one in five page views in the United States occurs 
on Facebook.2 As of 2012, adults had also become the most com-
mon users of Facebook, with 29.7% of users age 25 to 34.3 Litigators 
have realized that Facebook and other social media sites offer a 
“gold mine of potential evidence,” as these sites are “specifically 
designed to encourage users to record in writing and share with 
others what they are thinking or doing—and even where they are 
located—at any given moment.”4 
The benefits of social media discovery have become clear, evi-
denced by the increasing use of social networking in litigation.5 For 
example, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers found 
that 81% of attorneys who responded to its February 2010 study 
reported using evidence found on social networking sites in their 
                                                                                                                            
1 Jennifer K. Gregory, #bewareofovershare: Social Media Discovery and Importance in 
Intellectual Property Litigation, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 449, 450 (2013) 
(citing Maeve Duggan & Joanna Brenner, The Demographics of Social Media Users—2012, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. 2 (2013), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media/
Files/Reports/2013/PIP_SocialMediaUsers.pdf (asserting that “almost seven out of 
ten” adults using the internet use social networking sites). 
2 See Dan Noyes, The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics, ZEPHORIA, http://zephoria
.com/social-media/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/ (last updated Dec. 31, 2013). 
3 See id. 
4 Mariel Goetz, Social Media Evidence in Civil Litigation, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (2013), 
available at http://www.ropesgray.com/marielgoetz/~/media/Files/articles/2013/08/
TrialEvidence_ArticleReprint_SocialMediaEvidenceInCivilLitigation.ashx. 
5 Id. (“[I]t is becoming standard practice in litigation today to use social media sites to 
research parties; to establish or refute facts; to determine or rebut state of mind or health; 
and to identify, impeach or bolster the credibility of witnesses.”). 
230 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:227 
 
cases.6 Facebook was found to be the most popular source of evi-
dence, with 66% of attorneys responding indicating that they had 
used evidence found on the site.7 
Still, the introduction of this new technology has presented a 
unique challenge for the courts, “due to [social networking sites’] 
relative novelty and their ability to be shared by or with someone 
besides the original poster.”8 Furthermore, the varied and chang-
ing privacy controls on social media sites like Facebook have raised 
questions about the appropriate depth of discovery, as well as the 
correct means of such production. Yet, only recently did there be-
gin to be some “push back against efforts to obtain complete access 
to an individual’s social networking profile, even those portions 
restricted as private.”9 
Nearly all social networking sites offer options to allow portions 
of a user’s profile to remain “public” while other portions can be 
set to remain “private.” The “private” portions of a user’s profile 
are typically only accessible to those other users who are “friends” 
of the individual user. While it is obvious that any public portions 
of an individual’s social media account are available and accessible 
to adversarial parties, courts have struggled to create a coherent, 
consistent framework for the discoverability of the private content 
of a user’s social media account. More specifically, courts have not 
consistently answered the question of whether the entire contents 
of an individual’s private social media page are discoverable; or, 
rather, whether only certain “relevant” portions should be pro-
duced. This question becomes intertwined with the issue of how to 
best facilitate production of the content of social media sites, as 
                                                                                                                            
6 See John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence from 
Social Media Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 467 (2011) (citing Big Surge in 
Social Networking Evidence Says Survey of Nation’s Top Divorce Lawyers, AMERICAN 
ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.aaml.org/about-the-
academy/press/press-releases/e-discovery/big-surge-socialnetworking-evidence-says-
survey-). 
7 See id. 
8 Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 3366278, at *2 
(S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013). 
9 John G. Browning, With “Friends” Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Passwords, 
Privacy, and the Discovery of Social Media Content, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 505, 510 
(2013). 
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certain means of production may inadvertently require broad 
access to a user’s private content. This note aims to address and 
resolve these issues. 
First, in Part I, I will address some of the relevant background 
pertaining to social media discovery, and specifically, whether it is 
considered to generally be discoverable. Part II will then address 
the Stored Communications Act and how it may be applied to so-
cial media discovery requests. This will be followed by a discussion 
of the standards courts have developed to determine when they 
should permit discovery of an individual’s private social media ac-
count. In Part II, I discuss the various approaches to determine the 
appropriate depth of social media discovery and how courts have 
explored different options to prevent “overbroad” discovery re-
quests. Next, in Part III, I address how courts have ruled regarding 
the actual facilitation of discovery requests involving an individu-
al’s private social media account. Finally, in Part IV, I aim to re-
solve questions about how to treat these types of social media dis-
covery requests. Specifically, I make arguments about how courts 
should go about ruling on the depth of social media discovery re-
quests and what, if any, determinations such courts should make 
about the means of facilitating these discovery requests. 
I. IS AN INDIVIDUAL’S PRIVATE SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNT 
DISCOVERABLE? 
A. Does an Individual Have an Inherent, Protected Privacy Interest in 
His or Her Private Social Media Account? 
It is well-settled that “[r]elevant information in the private sec-
tion of [an individual’s] social media account is discoverable.”10 
The documents, information and photos contained within such an 
account are “not privileged nor protected from production by a 
common law right of privacy.”11 Specific attempts have been made 
                                                                                                                            
10 Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1014, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1 (S.D. 
Ohio Oct. 1, 2012) (citing Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 4374(PGG) 
(FM), 2012 WL 1197167, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012)). 
11 Id. (citing Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 
2012)). 
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to argue that the very fact that an individual has chosen to utilize 
particular privacy settings should suggest that the private contents 
of the individual’s Facebook page are shielded from discovery by 
that individual’s protected privacy interest in the content of such 
an account.12 These arguments rely on the notion that a protected 
privacy interest exists when individuals deliberately choose to (a) 
bar access by the general public to their page, and (b) only author-
ize certain individuals to access their page;13 however, such argu-
ments have been repeatedly rejected by courts.14 
As the court noted in Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion v. Simply Storage Management, LLC, content from social net-
working websites “is not shielded from discovery simply because it 
is ‘locked’ or private.”15 Although an individual’s privacy concerns 
may be relevant in determining whether “requested discovery is 
burdensome or oppressive, . . . a person’s expectation and intent 
that her communications be maintained as private is not a legiti-
mate basis for shielding those communications from discovery.”16 
It therefore becomes irrelevant whether or not an individual be-
lieves that he has maintained a “private” Facebook page; for, “in-
formation that an individual shares through social networking web-
sites [even while utilizing particular privacy settings,] may be co-
pied and disseminated by another, rendering any expectation of 
privacy meaningless.”17 In Patterson v. Turner Construction Co. the 
court drew a comparison between private social media pages and a 
                                                                                                                            
12 See Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); EEOC 
v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
13 See id. 
14 See, e.g., Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (“[W]hen Plaintiff created her Facebook and 
MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information would be 
shared with others, notwithstanding her privacy settings. Indeed, that is the very nature 
and purpose of these social networking sites else they would cease to exist . . . ‘[I]n this 
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in 
some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.’”) (citations omitted). 
15 Simply Storage, 270 F.R.D. at 434. 
16 Id. 
17 Beswick v. N. W. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 07-020592 CACE (03), 2011 WL 7005038 
(Trial Order) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2011) (citing Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (“[A]s 
neither Facebook nor MySpace guarantee complete privacy, Plaintiff has no legitimate 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”)); see also Moreno v. Hartford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 858, 862–63 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2009) (finding “no reasonable expectation 
of privacy where an individual posted information on MySpace”). 
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person’s diary, reasoning that in the same way that “relevant mat-
ter” from an individual’s diary is discoverable, any relevant ma-
terial from an individual’s Facebook account is discoverable re-
gardless of the privacy settings utilized by the page’s creator.18 
B. Does the Stored Communications Act Apply to Discovery Requests 
Made to Individual Social Media Users in Civil Litigation? 
1. What is the Stored Communications Act? 
The Stored Communications Act (formally titled “Unlawful 
access to stored communications” and hereinafter referred to as 
the “SCA”) provides, in pertinent part, that whoever: 
 
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a fa-
cility through which an electronic communication 
service is provided; or 
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access 
that facility; 
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized 
access to a wire or electronic communication while 
it is in electronic storage in such system shall be pu-
nished as provided . . . . 
. . . . 
(c) Exceptions – Subsection (a) of this section does 
not apply with respect to conduct authorized – 
(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or elec-
tronic communications service; 
(2) by a user of that service with respect to a com-
munication of or intended for that user . . . 19 
The court interpreted the SCA in Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund In-
surance Co., finding that the SCA prohibits an entity that provides 
an electronic communication service from knowingly divulging “to 
any person or entity the contents of a communication while in elec-
                                                                                                                            
18 Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 931 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (citing 
Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 741 N.Y.S.2d 369, 370 (2002)). 
19 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
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tronic storage by that service.”20 Therefore, even in light of a valid 
subpoena or court order, the SCA prohibits Facebook (an electron-
ic communication service) from revealing the contents of an indi-
vidual’s account to any non-governmental entity.21 Facebook is 
barred from providing anything more than basic subscriber infor-
mation.22 However, the Glazer court clarified that an electronic 
communication service, like Facebook, may provide the contents of 
communication if the electronic communication service is granted 
“lawful consent” to do so by the “originator or an intended reci-
pient of [the] communication” in question.23 
2. The Stored Communications Act Does Not Apply to 
Discovery Requests in Civil Litigation 
Parties have made attempts to argue that the SCA fully pro-
scribes Facebook from producing the content of an individual’s 
account, and further, that it bars any discovery of such accounts at 
all.24 Courts have repeatedly ruled that such propositions are mis-
guided.25 First, the SCA only applies to subpoena requests directed 
                                                                                                                            
20 Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 11 Civ. 4374(PGG) (FM), 2012 WL 1197167, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2012) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)); see also Crispin v. Christian 
Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972–73 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
21 See Browning, supra note 6, at 473 (The SCA “prohibits Facebook from disclosing 
the contents of a user’s Facebook account to any non-governmental entity even pursuant 
to a valid subpoena or court order.”). 
22 See id. (“The most Facebook can provide is the basic subscriber information for a 
particular account.”). 
23 Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167, at *2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)); see also Crispin, 717 
F. Supp. 2d at 972–73. 
24 See, e.g., Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 2011 WL 5632688 (Pa. Ct. C. P. Nov. 8, 
2011) (Trial Order) (defendant claimed that disclosure of her Facebook username and 
password may be in violation of the SCA); In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on 
Feb. 12, 2009, No. 09-MD-2085, 2011 WL 6370189, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) 
(“Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, disclosure of electronic communications is not 
barred by the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, which prohibits 
unauthorized access to stored electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a). The 
SCA does not apply to the user of the electronic communications service himself, nor 
does it impose civil or criminal liability when action is taken in good faith pursuant to a 
court order.”); Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167, at *2 (Plaintiff asserted that the SCA 
“proscribe[d] any effort to have [an electronic communication service or a remote 
computing service] produce transcripts of [the plaintiff’s] chats.” The court rejected this 
argument. See infra note 29). 
25 See Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167. 
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specifically at companies like Facebook and is therefore not appli-
cable to discovery requests between adversarial parties in civil liti-
gation.26 The SCA “is not a catch-all statute designed to protect 
the privacy of stored Internet communications. Rather it only ap-
plies to the enumerated entities. [If an individual party is not an 
electronic communication service or a remote computing service], 
the SCA does not protect her Facebook profile from discovery.”27 
Second, the SCA allows for an individual to sign a release form 
permitting Facebook to provide a party with the content of an indi-
vidual’s private account.28 In such a case, the court may also direct 
or require an individual to sign such a release form.29 
                                                                                                                            
26 See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 975–76 (citing Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 
253 F.R.D. 256, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to AOL, L.L.C., 550 
F. Supp. 2d 606, 611 (E.D. Va. 2008); O’Grady v. Super. Ct., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423 
(2006)) (holding that civil subpoenas are not permissible under the SCA, and the 
defendant may not directly request information from Facebook); see also Levine v. 
Culligan of Fla., Inc., No. 50-2011-CA-010339-XXXXMB, 2013 WL 1100404 (Trial 
Order) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 2013) (“[C]ourts seem to be in agreement that the [SCA] 
prohibits records from being subpoenaed directly from Facebook and other social 
networking sites.”) (citations omitted). 
27 Largent, 2011 WL 5632688. 
28 See Glazer, 2012 WL 1197167, at *2 (Electronic communication services and remote 
computer services may “divulge the contents of a communication with the ‘lawful 
consent’ of the originator or an intended recipient of that communication.”) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3)). 
29 See id. (“The Court need not determine whether Glazer’s communications are 
electronically stored, or whether Glazer consented to the disclosure of her LivePerson 
chats by agreeing to the Terms and Conditions, because it may simply direct that she 
consent to disclosure if the chats are likely to contain information relevant to this case. 
See, e.g., In re Air Crash near Clarence Ctr., N.Y., on Feb. 12, 2009, Nos. 09-MD-2085, 
09-CV-961 S, 2011 WL 6370189, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011) (directing plaintiff to 
produce relevant electronic communications, including “social media accounts, emails, 
text messages, and instant messages,” and noting that the defendant may request written 
authorizations to obtain such communications from third parties if the plaintiff’s 
production is insufficient); EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 434 
(S.D. Ind. 2010) (Content from social networking websites “is not shielded from 
discovery simply because it is ‘locked’ or ‘private.’ Although privacy concerns may be 
germane to the question of whether requested discovery is burdensome or oppressive and 
whether it has been sought for a proper purpose in the litigation, a person’s expectation 
and intent that her communications be maintained as private is not a legitimate basis for 
shielding those communications from discovery.”); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 
N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (requiring personal injury plaintiff to give 
defendant a properly-executed consent and authorization for her “Facebook and 
MySpace records, including any records previously deleted or archived by said 
operators.”). 
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C. What is Required for a Court to Allow the Discovery of an 
Individual’s Private Social Media Account? 
Courts have generally agreed that, in order to permit the dis-
covery of an individual’s private social media account, the request-
ing party must demonstrate that some threshold of “relevance” 
exists.30 Generally, this “relevance” is demonstrated by providing 
proof that the information available in an individual’s public Face-
book profile is relevant to the litigation.31 Often, this means that the 
requesting party has provided examples of information contained in 
the individual’s public Facebook profile that directly contradicts 
that individual’s claims or specifically relates to the claims in ques-
tion in the pending litigation.32 In Fawcett v. Altieri, the court sum-
                                                                                                                            
30 See Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 11-CV-1180, 2013 WL 1176504, at *3 (M.D. 
Ten. Mar. 20, 2013); Keller v. Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Casualty Co., No. CV 12-72-
M-DLC-JCL, 2013 WL 27731, at *4 (D. Mont. Jan. 2, 2013); Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. 
Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Romano, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 655. Contra 
Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 114 n.1 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). The court disagreed with this approach, stating: 
[Th]is approach can lead to results that are both too broad and too 
narrow. On the one hand, a plaintiff should not be required to turn 
over the private section of his or her Facebook profile (which may or 
may not contain relevant information) merely because the public 
section undermines the plaintiff’s claims. On the other hand, a 
plaintiff should be required to review the private section and produce 
any relevant information, regardless of what is reflected in the public 
section. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a party 
to prove the existence of relevant material before requesting it. 
Furthermore, this approach improperly shields from discovery the 
information of Facebook users who do not share any information 
publicly. 
Id. 
31 See Brogan v. Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., No. 08 CV 6048, 2013 WL 
1742689 (Trial Order) (Pa. Ct. C. P. Apr. 22, 2013) (“[A] party may obtain discovery of 
private Facebook posts, photographs and communications only if the electronically stored 
information is relevant, and the party may satisfy that relevancy requirement by showing 
that publicly accessible information posted on the user’s Facebook page controverts or 
challenges the user’s claims or defenses in the pending litigation.”). 
32 See, e.g., Loporcaro v. City of N.Y., 950 N.Y.S.2d 723, at *5, *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) 
(“[P]laintiffs argue that the moving defendant has not provided a sufficient factual 
predicate to obtain access to the non-public contents of plaintiff’s ‘FACEBOOK’ 
account . . . Since it appears that plaintiff has voluntarily posted at least some information 
about himself on Facebook which may contradict the claims made by him in the present 
action, he cannot claim that these postings are now somehow privileged or immune from 
discovery. Therefore, granting [the defendant] access to portions of plaintiff’s Facebook 
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marized this concept of relevance, stating that “[t]he party re-
questing the discovery of an adversary’s restricted social media ac-
counts should first demonstrate a good faith basis to make the re-
quest.”33 In the federal context, relevancy is defined under Rule 26 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and is to be “construed 
broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably 
could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or 
may be in th[e] case.”34 
The court found that the defendant in Zimmerman v. Weis Mar-
kets, Inc. made this necessary demonstration.35 Zimmerman sought 
damages for injuries to his leg resulting from an accident that oc-
curred while he was operating a forklift at the Weis Markets’ ware-
house. Specifically, Zimmerman complained that “‘his health in 
general [had] been seriously and permanently impaired and com-
promised,’ and that ‘he [had] sustained a permanent diminution in 
the ability to enjoy life and life’s pleasures.’”36 However, upon re-
view of Zimmerman’s public Facebook profile, the defendants 
                                                                                                                            
account, including access to certain deleted materials, may well prove relevant and 
necessary to the defense.”) (citing generally Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 931 
N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Romano, 907 N.Y.S. 2d at 650). 
33 Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
34 Giacchetto, 293 F.R.D. at 113 (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 
340, 351 (1978)) (citing Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 882 F.2d 682, 687 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (holding that “the broad scope of discovery delimited by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure is designed to achieve disclosure of all the evidence relevant to the merits 
of a controversy.”); Barrett v. City of N.Y., 237 F.R.D. 39, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting 
that the information sought “need not be admissible at trial to be discoverable”); Brown 
v. City of N.Y., No. CV 2008–5095(FB)(MDG), 2011 WL 4594276, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 
30, 2011) (stating, “when broader discovery is sought by the parties, the Court should 
determine the scope according to the reasonable needs of the action”)). 
35 Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., Inc., No. 09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410 (Pa. Ct. C. P. May 
19, 2011) (Trial Order) (“It is well recognized that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure, like New York, provide for liberal discovery: ‘Generally, discovery is liberally 
allowed with respect to any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the cause being 
tried. Pa.R.C.P. 4003.1.’ Zimmerman placed his physical condition in issue, and Weis 
Markets is entitled to discovery thereon. Based on a review of the publicly accessible 
portions of his Facebook and MySpace accounts, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
additional relevant and material information on the non-public portions of these sites. 
Zimmerman voluntarily posted all of the pictures and information on his Facebook and 
MySpace sites to share with other users of these social network sites, and he cannot now 
claim he possesses any reasonable expectation of privacy to prevent Weis Markets from 
access to such information.”) (citations omitted). 
36 Id. (citing Complaint, ¶ 25(b), (e) and (f)). 
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found that Zimmerman’s interests included “‘ridin’ and ‘bike 
stunts.’”37 A review of Zimmerman’s public MySpace profile also 
revealed photos of Zimmerman with his motorcycle before and af-
ter an accident, as well as a photo of Zimmerman in shorts, where 
the scar from his accident at Weis Markets was clearly visible.38 
This contradicted Zimmerman’s deposition testimony, which 
stated that he did not wear shorts because he was too embarrassed 
by the scar on his leg.39 Adopting the rationale of the opinion in 
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc.,40 the Zimmerman court 
found that Weis Markets had provided more than the required 
“good faith basis”41 to permit discovery of Zimmerman’s private 
Facebook and MySpace accounts.42 
The court reached an analogous decision in Richards v. Hertz 
Corp., finding that “[the defendants] made a showing that at least 
some of the discovery sought [would] result in the disclosure of 
relevant evidence or is reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of information bearing on [the plaintiff’s] claim.”43 In Richards, 
multiple plaintiffs sought to recover damages for personal injuries 
resulting from an automobile accident.44 One plaintiff, McCarthy, 
testified at a deposition that her injuries from the accident “im-
paired her ability to play sports, and caused her to suffer pain that 
was exacerbated in cold weather.”45 The defendants conducted a 
                                                                                                                            
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at n.4 (“As set forth in McMillen: ‘Where there is an indication that a person’s 
social network sites contain information relevant to the prosecution or defense of a 
lawsuit, therefore, and given Koken’s [Koken v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 911 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 
Cmwlth. 2006)] admonition that the courts should allow litigants to utilize ‘all rational 
means for ascertaining the truth,’ 911 A.2d at 1027, and the law’s general dispreference 
for the allowance of privileges, access to those sites should be freely granted.’”) (quoting 
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Ct. 
C. P. Sept. 9, 2010) (Trial Order)). 
41 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
42 See Zimmerman, 2011 WL 2065410 (“Based on a review of the publicly accessible 
portions of his Facebook and MySpace accounts, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
additional relevant and material information on the non-public portions of these sites.”). 
43 Richards v. Hertz Corp., 953 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (citing 
Patterson v. Turner Const. Co., 931 N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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search of the portions of McCarthy’s Facebook profile that were 
not blocked by privacy settings and found photographs of McCar-
thy skiing in the snow, dated six months after her deposition.46 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the defendants “demonstrated that 
McCarthy’s Facebook profile contained a photograph that was 
probative of the issue of the extent of her alleged injuries, and it is 
reasonable to believe that other portions of her Facebook profile 
may contain further evidence relevant to that issue.”47 
However, in Tompkins v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport, the court 
characterized the defendant’s discovery request as a “proverbial 
fishing expedition” and declined to find such requisite relevance.48 
Tompkins was a slip-and-fall case, in which the plaintiff claimed 
that as a result of injuries sustained at the Detroit Metropolitan 
Airport she was “impaired in her ability to work and enjoy life.”49 
The defendants attempted to show that the plaintiff’s public Face-
book postings demonstrated the relevance of the plaintiff’s private 
Facebook postings.50 The court rejected this argument, noting that: 
The public postings . . . are photographs showing 
the Plaintiff holding a very small dog and smiling, 
and standing with two other people at a birthday 
party in Florida . . . . [T]hese pictures are not incon-
sistent with Plaintiffs claim of injury or with the 
medical information she has provided. She does not 
claim that she is bed-ridden, or that she is incapable 
of leaving her house or participating in modest so-
cial activities. The dog in the photograph appears to 
weigh no more than five pounds and could be lifted 
with minimal effort.51 
                                                                                                                            
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012) 
(“[T]he Defendant does not have a generalized right to rummage at will through 
information that Plaintiff has limited from public view. Rather, consistent with Rule 
26(b) . . . there must be a threshold showing that the request information is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”). 
49 Id. at 387. 
50 Id. at 388. 
51 Id. at 388–89. 
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II. WHAT OPTIONS HAVE COURTS EXPLORED TO PREVENT 
“OVERBROAD” DISCOVERY REQUESTS? WHEN DOES A 
REQUEST BECOME “OVERBROAD”? 
A. Complete, or Near-Complete, Discovery of an Individual’s Private 
Social Media Account 
Even after successfully convincing a judge that the necessary 
“relevance” exists to compel production of an individual’s private 
social media account, parties are still faced with arguing the appro-
priate depth of such discovery. Courts have taken varied approach-
es to this issue, typically framing their inquiry to best prevent 
“overbroad” discovery. In Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, the court arti-
culated at least one circumstance in which it was clear that a dis-
covery request of an individual’s private social media account was 
overbroad.52 In response to the defendant’s request for the plain-
tiff’s username and password, the court reasoned that such access 
would provide defendant with “all the information in the private 
sections of [the plaintiff’s] social media accounts—relevant and 
irrelevant alike.”53 The court compared the request to a request for 
all of the information in a file cabinet, finding that “[t]he fact that 
the information defendants seek is in an electronic file as opposed 
to a file cabinet does not give them the right to rummage through 
the entire file.”54 
Yet, many courts have permitted discovery requests that the 
Howell court may have characterized as “overbroad,” allowing for 
the complete or near-complete discovery of the entirety of an indi-
vidual’s private Facebook profile.55 For example, the plaintiff in 
                                                                                                                            
52 Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-1014, 2012 WL 5265170 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 
2012). 
53 Id. at *1. 
54 Id. 
55 See, e.g., Moore v. Miller, No. 10-651, 2013 WL 2456114, at *3 (D. Colo. June 6, 
2013) (“Mr. Moore shall produce, under shield of the Court’s standard protective order, 
his entire Facebook history, including his Activity Log, from the date of his arrest forward 
and continuing to the close of discovery.”); Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., No. 
3:08-1807, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (Plaintiff was ordered to 
provide a complete production of all Facebook data to the defendant.); Beswick v. N. W. 
Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 07-020592 CACE (03), 2011 WL 7005038 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 
2011) (Trial Order) (Plaintiff was ordered to “identify any internet social media websites 
which [he]  . . .  used and/or maintain[ed] an account in the last five (5) years” and to 
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Beswick v. North West Medical Center, Inc. claimed that the defen-
dant’s medical negligence caused permanent brain injuries.56 The 
defendant’s discovery request asked the plaintiff to provide (1) any 
internet social media website which the plaintiff has used or main-
tained in the last five years; and (2) the plaintiff’s username and 
password, or a copy of all non-privileged content/data shared on 
the account in the last five years.57 The Beswick court found first 
that, overall, this request was relevant to the claims in question.58 
The request also would supply the defendant with the necessary 
information to effectively refute the plaintiff’s noneconomic dam-
ages claims.59 Finally, the request was “reasonably calculated to 
lead to admissible evidence.”60 The court held that “the interroga-
tories [were] not overbroad as they specifically delineate the infor-
mation sought. Furthermore, the interrogatories [were] narrow in 
scope, as they include a time limitation of five years.”61 The Bes-
wick court’s holding suggested that the defendant’s request “simp-
ly asking for” the plaintiff’s username and password was sufficient 
to provide the necessary “specificity”62 that the court sought.63 
Additionally, the court went so far as to allow discovery of the enti-
                                                                                                                            
“provide [his] username and password, or, alternatively . . . provide a copy of all non-
privileged content/data shared on the account in the last five (5) years.” Plaintiff was 
ordered to provide a privilege log if there was any privilege to assert.); McCann v. 
Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 910 N.Y.S.2d 614 (2010); Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle 
Ams., Inc., No. 3:12-0127, 2012 WL 3763545, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2012) (Plaintiff was 
ordered to produce “(1)any: (a) email or text messages that plaintiff sent to, received 
from, or exchanged with any current and former employee of defendant, as well as 
messages forwarding such messages; or (b) online social media communications by 
plaintiff, including profiles, postings, messages, status updates, wall comments, causes 
joined, groups joined, activity streams, applications, blog entries, photographs, or media 
clips, as well as third-party online social media communications that place plaintiff’s own 
communications in context; (2) from [the date of the incident in question] to the [date of 
the order]; (3) that reveal, refer, or relate to: (a) any significant emotion, feeling, or 
mental state allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct; or (b) events or communications 
that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental 
state allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct.”).  
56 Beswick, 2011 WL 7005038. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 See cases cited supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
63 See Browning, supra note 9, at 513. 
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rety of the plaintiff’s private Facebook account, reasoning, “the 
entire content of the account was ‘clearly relevant.’”64 
Similarly, in Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter’s School, the court 
ordered the plaintiff to produce all of the documents contained with-
in her private Facebook account, reasoning that the “relevance of 
the content of Plaintiff’s Facebook usage as to both liability and 
damages . . . is more in the eye of the beholder than subject to strict 
legal demarcations, and production should not be limited to Plain-
tiff’s own determination of what may be ‘reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’”65 The Bass plaintiff 
was a teenager who claimed that Miss Porter’s School (an exclu-
sive private school located in Farmington, Connecticut) had failed 
to protect her from the bullying she experienced while attending 
the school.66 Bass initiated the suit after she was expelled from 
Miss Porter’s due to excessive absences—absences, which Bass 
argued, were the result of the emotional distress she suffered be-
cause of the bullying.67 Facebook provided Bass with approximately 
750 pages of documents that contained the entire contents of Bass’ 
private Facebook account; however, prior to the court’s order, 
Bass had only turned over 100 of these pages to the requesting de-
fendants.68 Bass acknowledged that her claims relied, in part, on 
certain Facebook postings and related correspondence from her 
time at Miss Porter’s, but she still argued that the documents re-
quested were “irrelevant and immaterial” and therefore should not 
be produced in full.69 The court rejected this argument, noting 
“Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user’s relationships and 
state of mind at the time of the content’s posting.”70 In this case it 
seemed that the court rejected the notion that the burden is placed 
on a responding party to properly, and ethically, determine what 
information is responsive to a discovery request. Rather, the court 
concluded that this incident seemed to uniquely require that the 
                                                                                                                            
64 Id. (emphasis added). 
65 Bass ex rel. Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., No. 3:08-1807, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (emphasis added). 
66 Id.; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488. 
67 Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488. 
68 Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488. 
69 Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488. 
70 Bass, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1; see Browning, supra note 6, at 488. 
2014] "SHARING" WITH THE COURT 243 
 
requesting party be able to determine the relevance of requested ma-
terials themselves. 
The District of Oregon also ordered the production of all con-
tent contained within a plaintiff’s social media accounts. Yet, the 
court qualified the request somewhat, limiting discovery produc-
tion to content that revealed, referred, or related to “(a) any signif-
icant emotion, feeling, or mental state allegedly caused by defen-
dant’s conduct; or (b) events or communications that could rea-
sonably be expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, or 
mental state allegedly caused by defendant’s conduct.”71 The 
plaintiff in this case brought an employment discrimination action 
against her employer, claiming race discrimination and retalia-
tion.72 The court’s order ultimately required production of “all [of] 
the plaintiff’s social media footprint, including profiles, postings, 
messages, status updates, wall comments, causes joined, Likes, 
groups joined, activity streams, applications, blog entries, photo-
graphs, and media clips, as well as third-party social media com-
munications that placed the plaintiff’s own communications in 
context.”73 The court justified its ruling by explaining that it was 
“impossible for the court to define the limits of discovery in such 
cases with enough precision to satisfy the litigant who is called 
upon to make a responsive production.”74 Additionally, the court 
chose to treat all forms of electronic communications similarly, 
finding “no principled reason” to distinguish between emails, text 
messages, or social media platforms.75 
In McCann v. Harleysville, the court declined to rule out the 
possibility of complete social media disclosure, without fully en-
dorsing the practice. First, the court stated that the defendant’s 
initial discovery request was essentially a “fishing expedition” into 
the plaintiff’s private Facebook account, as it was not supported by 
                                                                                                                            
71 Robinson v. Jones Lang LaSalle Ams., Inc., No. 12-0127, 2012 WL 3763545, *2 (D. 
Or. Aug. 29, 2012). 
72 Id. 
73 Thomas Roe Frazer II, Social Media: From Discovery to Marketing-A Primer for 
Lawyers, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 549 (2013). 
74 Robinson, 2012 WL 3763545, at *2. 
75 Id. at *1. 
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a showing of relevance.76 However, the court acknowledged that 
the trial court had “abused its discretion in prohibiting defendant 
from seeking disclosure of plaintiff’s Facebook account at a future 
date.”77 
Comparatively, some courts have explicitly stated that full dis-
closure of an individual’s private social media account is imper-
missible.78 In Winchell v. Lopiccolo, a plaintiff sought damages re-
sulting from injuries affecting her cognitive function.79 The defen-
dants requested full access to the plaintiff’s Facebook account (re-
questing authorization to access the plaintiff’s Facebook them-
selves—resulting in unrestricted access), asserting that the ac-
count’s content might shed light on the plaintiff’s “ability to por-
tray cognitive function.”80 Specifically, the defendant’s request 
argued that: 
The layout of [the plaintiff’s] Facebook page would 
demonstrate cognitive function inasmuch as the 
layout of a Facebook page calls for creativity of 
some sort as well as thought in providing captions 
for photographs, narrative posts written by the 
plaintiff as well as her ability to write and comment. 
Writings on the page would be direct and circums-
tantial evidence of her claims. Moreover, lucid and 
logical writing or a lack thereof, would be useful in 
the defense and/or assessment of this case.81 
The court acknowledged that in cases that involve allegations 
surrounding a plaintiff’s mental capacity, “every bit of informa-
tion” that was contained within the plaintiff’s Facebook page 
would, to some extent, present evidence of some level of cognitive 
                                                                                                                            
76 McCann v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 910 N.Y.S.2d, 614, 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2010). 
77 Id. 
78 See, e.g., Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 389 (E.D. Mich. 
2012) (“[T]he request for the entire account, which may well contain voluminous 
personal material having nothing to do with this case, is overly broad.”); Winchell v. 
Lopiccolo, 954 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (finding that the “Defendants’ 
Request for unrestricted access to Plaintiff’s Facebook page [was] overbroad.”). 
79 Winchell, 954 N.Y.S.2d at 423. 
80 Id. (citations omitted). 
81 Id. 
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function.82 As a result, the court found that the defendant’s re-
quest for unrestricted access to the Plaintiff’s Facebook page was 
overbroad, denying discovery as requested.83 The court therefore 
essentially concluded that such unrestricted access should always 
be deemed overbroad, even in light of acknowledging that the enti-
rety of an individual’s Facebook account would be, in fact, rele-
vant. Although it does seem that, intuitively, requesting the entire-
ty of an individual’s private social media account is likely “over-
broad,” the court’s reasoning here appears contradictory. For, if a 
judge is willing to conclude that “every bit of information” con-
tained in an individual’s account would be relevant, then the ac-
companying ruling should permit discovery of all relevant informa-
tion—no matter how broad—thereby allowing discovery of the en-
tire account. 
The court’s opinion in Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union 
Free School District further discusses the appropriate depth of dis-
covery in emotional damages cases involving requests for the pro-
duction of an individual’s private social media accounts. The plain-
tiff in Giacchetto claimed that the defendant violated the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, subjecting the plaintiff to discrimination 
based on her diagnosis of adult Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder.84 The defendant moved to compel authorizations for the 
release of all social media account records, arguing that “informa-
tion from Plaintiff’s social networking accounts is relevant to Plain-
tiff’s claims of physical and emotional damages because it reflects 
her ‘levels of social interaction and daily functioning’ and her 
‘emotional and psychological state.’”85 The court found that broad 
discovery of the plaintiff’s social media account was not permissi-
ble merely because the plaintiff’s claims required an inquiry into 
the plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress, stating that, “[i]f the 
Court were to allow broad discovery of Plaintiff’s social networking 
postings as part of the emotional distress inquiry, then there would 
                                                                                                                            
82 Id. at 424. 
83 Id. (noting that “[t]he Court is troubled by the breadth of Defendant’s Request for 
authorization for Plaintiff’s Facebook page because it seeks unrestricted access.”). 
84 Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 113 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
85 Id. at 114 (citations omitted). 
246 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:227 
 
be no principled reason to prevent discovery into every other per-
sonal communication the Plaintiff had or sent since [the] alleged 
incident.”86 Citing Rozell v. Ross-Holst, the court noted that, theo-
retically, a person’s every action could, to some degree, reflect his 
emotional state; but, this could not justify “requiring the produc-
tion of every thought [an individual] may have reduced to writing 
or . . . the deposition of everyone [he or she] might have talked 
to.”87 
Additionally, the Giacchetto court analyzed the decision in Of-
fenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., finding support for different analyses 
of social media discovery requests, depending on the nature of the 
claims in question.88 Giacchetto notes that, although the plaintiff’s 
claims in Offenback involved both physical and psychological dam-
ages, after an in camera review of the plaintiff’s Facebook and 
MySpace accounts, the Offenback court did not order the produc-
tion of any content expressing emotion or relating to social activi-
ties with friends.89 The Offenback court did, however, compel pro-
duction of other posts relating to the plaintiff’s alleged physical in-
juries.90 Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson found this to 
suggest that “Offenback underscores an important distinction be-
tween the relevance of social networking information to claims for 
physical damages and claims for emotional damages.”91 Judge 
Tomlinson explained that, while posts exhibiting physical activity 
in light of a plaintiff’s claims for physical damages are obviously 
relevant, it is more difficult to find such clear cut relevance when 
                                                                                                                            
86 Id. at 115. 
87 Id. (citing Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK)JCF, 2006 WL 163143, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006) (motion to compel emails that defendants argued provided a 
contemporaneous record of plaintiff’s emotional state”); Kennedy v. Contract Pharmacal 
Corp., No. CV 12–2664(JFB)(ETB), 2013 WL 1966219, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 13, 2013) 
(denying motion to compel “all documents . . . reflecting and/or regarding Plaintiff’s 
expression of an emotional feeling while utilizing a social networking site” where there 
was no specificity and no attempt to limit the requests to any allegedly relevant acts)). 
88 Id. at 115–16 (citing Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1789, 2011 WL 
2491371 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011)). 
89 Id. 
90 Offenback, 2011 WL 2491371, at *2–3 (Plaintiff was compelled to produce all 
information deemed “potentially relevant” by the court after an in camera review, which 
included comments by the plaintiff and his friends indicating that the plaintiff made long 
trips on his motorcycle.) 
91 Giacchetto, 293 F.R.D. at 115–16. 
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analyzing “routine expressions of mood” in the context of an emo-
tional distress claim.92 Ultimately, in light of these considerations, 
Giacchetto called for the production of “limited social networking 
postings.”93 Here the court took a position similar to that in Win-
chell; however, the Giacchetto court declined to actually conclude 
(as Winchell did) that the entirety of the plaintiff’s private social 
media account was relevant. This distinction proves to be impor-
tant because Giacchetto clarifies the court’s reasons for concluding 
that it is perhaps unwise to place too much reliance on what an in-
dividual once perceived to be a casual expression of thoughts or 
emotions. 
B. “Tailored” Requests Permitting Only the Discovery of “Relevant” 
Material 
The holdings of the aforementioned cases suggest the existence 
of an alternative approach to assessing the appropriate depth of 
discovery in requests for private social media content. Timothy C. 
Quinn argues that private content “should be discoverable only to 
a certain extent and under certain circumstances,” and such access 
should not be freely granted.94 Furthermore, “at the very least, 
[such] discovery requests should be narrowly tailored to seek only 
relevant information.”95 John G. Browning similarly asserts that 
                                                                                                                            
92 Id. at 116 (“For example, a severely depressed person may have a good day or several 
good days and choose to post about those days and avoid posting about moods more 
reflective of his or her actual emotional state.”) (citing Kathryn R. Brown, The Risks of 
Taking Facebook at Face Value: Why the Psychology of Social Networking Should Influence the 
Evidentiary Relevance of Facebook Photographs, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 357, 365 
(2012) (“Because social networking websites enable users to craft a desired image to 
display to others, social scientists have posited that outside observers can misinterpret 
that impression.”)). 
93 Id. (Plaintiff was required to produce “any specific references to the emotional 
distress she claims she suffered or treatment she received in connection with the 
incidents underlying her Amended Complaint (e.g., references to a diagnosable condition 
or visits to medical professionals).” Because the plaintiff, “in seeking emotional distress 
damages . . . opened the door to discovery into other potential sources/causes of that 
distress,” she was also ordered to produce “any postings on social networking websites 
that refer to an alternative potential stressor.”). See also Offenback, 2011 WL 2491371, at 
*2–3. 
94 Timothy C. Quinn, The Discoverability of Private Social Media Content: Are 
Pennsylvania Trial Courts Going too Far by Granting Litigants Unfettered Access to Their 
Opponents’ Social Media Accounts?, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 787, 806 (2013). 
95 Id. (emphasis added). 
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practitioners, when drafting social media discovery requests, 
should refrain from being excessively broad.96 Instead, he says, re-
quests should be tailored to specify the precise content that is 
sought, or should be clearly tied to the claims in question.97 As an 
example, Browning provides that, “instead of just a blanket request 
for all content, [litigants should] seek ‘all online profiles, postings, 
messages (including, but not limited to, tweets, replies, re-tweets, 
direct messages, status updates, wall comments, groups joined, ac-
tivity streams, and blog entries), photographs, videos, and online 
communication’ relating to particular claims, allegations of mental 
anguish or emotional distress, defenses, et cetera.”98 
In Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., Mailhoit brought suit 
against her former employer, Home Depot, making claims about 
her mental and emotional state.99 The court responded to four dis-
covery requests, three of which were deemed overly broad and 
were accordingly denied, and, one of which was granted because 
the request was tailored to the specific claims in question.100 The 
court granted the defendant’s request for all social networking site 
communications “between Plaintiff and any current or former 
Home Depot employees, or which in any way refer  . . .  to her em-
ployment at Home Depot or this lawsuit,” explaining that the re-
quest was “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence.”101 Furthermore, the court found that this re-
quest was not overly burdensome and was technically practical.102 
In contrast, Mailhoit denied the defendant’s request for discov-
ery of: 
                                                                                                                            
96 Browning, supra note 6, at 473. 
97 Id. at 474. 
98 Id. See also Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 
3366278, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013) (“[Defendant] only claims that communications 
‘relating to the Plaintiff’s enjoyment of life, ability to engage in outdoor activities, and 
employment activities . . . [are] directly relevant.’ The parties do not appear to disagree 
about what materials within [Plaintiffs’] Facebook archives would be relevant.” (citing 
Defendant’s Reply, ¶ 13)). 
99 See Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 569 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
100 Id. at 569, 571–73. 
101 Id. at 572. 
102 See id. 
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(1) Any profiles, postings or messages (including 
status updates, wall comments, causes joined, 
groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) from 
social networking sites from October 2005 (the ap-
proximate date Plaintiff claims she first was discri-
minated against by Home Depot) through the 
present, that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion, 
feeling, or mental state of Plaintiff, as well as com-
munications by or from Plaintiff that reveal, refer, or 
relate to events that could reasonably be expected to 
produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental 
state; (2) Third-party communications to Plaintiff 
that place her own communications in context; . . . 
(4) Any pictures of Plaintiff taken during the rele-
vant time period and posted on Plaintiff’s profile or 
tagged or otherwise linked to her profile.103 
The court found such requests to be vague, overbroad, not 
“reasonably particular,” and suggestive of a “fishing expedi-
tion.”104 
In Giacchetto (the facts of which were articulated in the pre-
vious section), the court declined to permit general access to the 
plaintiff’s private social media accounts.105 Instead, the court li-
mited the scope of permissible discovery, instructing the plaintiff 
to produce “any specific references to the emotional distress she 
claims she suffered or treatment she received in connection with 
the incidents underlying her Amended Complaint (e.g., references 
to a diagnosable condition or visits to medical professionals).”106 
The plaintiff was also required to produce any social network post-
ings that referred to “an alternative potential stressor,” as the 
plaintiff welcomed such discovery by seeking emotional distress 
damages (which invites discovery of all potential causes for the al-
leged distress).107 
                                                                                                                            
103 Id. at 569 (citing Joint Stipulation at 2). 
104 See id. at 571–72. 
105 See Giacchetto v. Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch. Dist., 293 F.R.D. 112, 117 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
106 Id. at 116. 
107 See id. 
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Other cases have articulated a limited, narrowly tailored scope 
of discovery when physical damages are at issue. The plaintiff in 
Scipione v. Advance Stores Co., claimed damages relating to an injury 
to her knee during a purported slip-and-fall at Advance Auto Parts 
Store.108 The court ultimately approved an agreement reached by 
the parties regarding the production of the content of the plaintiff’s 
Facebook account.109 The plaintiff was required to produce “cop-
ies of her Facebook content since [three years prior to the accident] 
that refers to her knee or her alleged injury, and copies of all photos 
of her on Facebook since [the date of the accident.]”110 
In Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the 
court addressed a plaintiff’s claim that State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company failed to provide her with settlement 
benefits stemming from a car accident in which the plaintiff was 
permanently injured.111 The defendant sought production of “[a]ll 
photographs posted, uploaded, or otherwise added to any social 
networking sites or blogs . . . posted since the date of the accident 
alleged in the Complaint [including] photographs posted by others 
in which [the plaintiff] has been tagged or otherwise identified 
therein.”112 The court found that, because the request asked the 
plaintiff to produce all photographs that had been added to any so-
cial networking site since the date of the accident, including those 
that were not even of the plaintiff, or taken by the plaintiff, the re-
quest was “overly broad on its face.”113 Therefore the court 
granted the request in part, ordering the plaintiff to produce “all 
photographs added to any [social networking site] since the date of 
                                                                                                                            
108 See Scipione v. Advance Stores Co., No. 8:12-cv-687-T-24AEP, 2013 WL 646405, at 
*1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2013). 
109 See id. at *1–2. 
110 Id. at *1. 
111 See Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-632-J-12JBT, 2011 
WL 7936671 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2011) (“The Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks recovery of 
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage benefits under stacking policies of automobile 
insurance issued by State Farm which provides a total of three hundred thousand dollars 
($300,000.00) in available uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage benefits.”). 
112 See Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-632-J-JBT, 2012 WL 
555759, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2012). 
113 Id. at *2. 
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the subject accident that depict Plaintiff, regardless of who posted the 
photograph.”114 
Although the plaintiff argued that she should not have to pro-
duce photographs that were merely “tagged”115 of her, the court 
was not persuaded. Citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion v. Simply Storage, the plaintiff asserted that such tagged photos 
were “less likely to be relevant” than photos that she had posted 
herself.116 “Nevertheless,” the court stated, “the potential rele-
vancy of such photographs outweighs any burden of production or 
privacy interest therein.”117 
Courts that have chosen to only permit the production of nar-
rowly tailored discovery requests frequently require that such tai-
loring provide for a specific, relevant time period (rather than call-
ing for the producing party to sift through the entire contents of an 
individual’s social media account). Such was the case in Levine v. 
Culligan of Florida, Inc., where the court found the defendant’s re-
quest to be overly broad, in part, because it was not limited in 
time.118 In the context of cases involving a particular accident, 
courts may also limit production to social media content created on 
or after the date of the accident.119 
Limiting production to requests that are both narrowly tailored 
and limited in time (if possible) provides what is seemingly the 
most fluid and adaptable means for preventing “overbroad” dis-
                                                                                                                            
114 Id. (emphasis added). 
115 “‘Tagging’ is the process by which a third party posts a picture and links people in 
the picture to their profiles so that the picture will appear in the profiles of the person 
who ‘tagged’ the people in the picture, as well as on the profiles of the people who were 
identified in the picture.” Id. at n.3 (citing EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 
F.R.D. 430, 436 n.3 (S.D. Ind. 2010)). 
116 Id. at *2 (citing EEOC, 270 F.R.D. at 436). 
117 Id. 
118 See Levine v. Culligan of Florida, Inc., No. 50-2011-CA-010339-XXXXMB, 2013 WL 
1100404, at *5 (Trial Order) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 2013) (“[W]hile Defendant’s second 
request for ‘all other social networking sites’ is limited form [sic] the date of the incident 
until present, Defendant’s initial request for Plaintiff’s Facebook profile is not limited in 
time and therefore overly broad.”). 
119 See, e.g., Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 3366278, 
at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013) (“Since [Defendant] seeks information on the effects of 
Plaintiff’s injuries, the court finds that only the material dated on or after the accident 
would be relevant to their claim.”). 
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covery requests. By requiring narrowly tailored discovery requests, 
courts begin to omit some of the difficulties presented by full dis-
closure. First, such requests must necessarily have some relation to 
the claims in question (as is also required for the “relevance” in-
quiry), making it far less likely that the requests turn into a “fishing 
expedition.” Also, narrowly tailored requests allow the responding 
party to have an initial framework of requests, providing the oppor-
tunity to negotiate or fine-tune the specifics of the discovery re-
quest in question (if the party wishes to contest them). 
C. Provide Adversary With the Individual’s Username and Password  
A number of common pleas courts have, upon the requisite 
showing of relevance, required a party to provide its adversary with 
the usernames and passwords for any private social media accounts 
held by the complaining individual as a means of producing re-
quested social media material.120 Meanwhile, some federal district 
courts have found that such requests for an individual’s log-in in-
formation are “too broad and [lack] reasonable particularity under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b).”121 In Mazzarella v. Mount Airy #1, LLC, the 
plaintiff objected to a discovery request seeking the plaintiff’s 
username and password, citing privacy concerns.122 The court 
granted the defendant’s motion to compel, stating “[t]he informa-
tion requested . . . could lead to relevant information. Furthermore, 
Plaintiff’s argument of an expectation of privacy regarding her use 
of social media is displaced. Those who elect to use social media, 
and place things on the internet for viewing, sharing and use with 
others, waives an expectation of privacy.”123 
                                                                                                                            
120 See Brogan v. Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., No. 08-CV-6048, 2013 WL 
1742689 (Trial Order) (Pa. Ct. C. P. Apr. 22, 2013) (“[A] few common pleas courts have 
required plaintiffs to provide the defense with their Facebook usernames and passwords 
based upon a threshold showing of relevance.”); see also Largent v. Reed, No. 2009-1823, 
2011 WL 5632688 (Pa. Ct. C. P. Nov. 8, 2011) (Trial Order); Zimmerman v. Weis Mkts., 
Inc., No. 09-1535, 2011 WL 2065410 (Pa. Ct. C. P. May 19, 2011) (Trial Order); 
McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc., No. 113-2010 CD, 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa. Ct. 
C. P. Sept. 9, 2010) (Trial Order). 
121 Id. (citations omitted). 
122 See Browning, supra note 9, at 513–14 (quoting Mazzarella v. Mount Airy #1, LLC, 
No. 1798 Civ. 2009, 2012 WL 6000678, at *1 (Pa. Ct. C. P. Nov. 7, 2012) (order granting 
defendant’s motion to compel)). 
123 Id. 
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The court ruled similarly in Zimmerman v. Weis Markets, Inc., 
Largent v. Reed and Gallagher v. Urbanovich, requiring in each case 
that a party provide their requesting adversary with log-in informa-
tion for all social media accounts in order to facilitate review of the 
accounts’ content. In all three cases, the court also directed the 
individual account holders to “not take steps to delete or alter ex-
isting information and posts on [social media accounts.]”124 In Lar-
gent, the court reasoned, “[w]e agree with [the defendant] that in-
formation contained on [the plaintiff’s] Facebook profile is disco-
verable. It is relevant and not covered by any privilege, and the re-
quest is not unreasonable. We will thus allow [the defendant] 
access to [the plaintiff’s] Facebook account to look for the neces-
sary information.”125 In Gallagher, the court provided that access 
to one’s Facebook account should be limited to a seven-day win-
dow.126 Gallagher is also distinguished from this line of cases be-
cause the requesting party was not the defendant; rather, the court 
ordered the defendant to produce his Facebook username and 
password to the plaintiff.127 
In addition, the production of log-in information has not only 
been limited to the requesting party. In a Connecticut family law 
case, Gallion v. Gallion, Judge Kenneth Shluger ordered both parties 
in a divorce to “exchange . . . their client’s Facebook and dating 
website passwords.”128 Also, at least one court has specifically 
stated that this means of production would suggest an unduly bur-
densome invasion of privacy. In Higgins v. Koch Development Corp., 
the court found that the defendant had taken “sufficient steps to 
avoid unduly invading [the plaintiffs’] privacy” precisely because it 
                                                                                                                            
124 See Zimmerman, 2011 WL 2065410; see also Largent, 2011 WL 5632688 (“Plaintiff 
shall not delete or otherwise erase any information on her Facebook account.”); 
Gallagher v. Urbanovich, No. 2010-33418 (Pa. Ct. C. P. Feb. 27, 2012) (order granting 
plaintiff’s motion to compel) (Judge William Carpenter ordered the defendant to “not 
delete or otherwise erase any information on his Facebook account.”). 
125 Largent, 2011 WL 5632688. 
126 See Browning, supra note 9, at 513 (citing Gallagher, No. 2010-33418). 
127 See id. at 512. 
128 Id. (quoting Gallion v. Gallion, No. FA114116955S, 2011 WL 4953451, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011)). 
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had refrained from requesting the plaintiffs’ Facebook pass-
words.129 
Ultimately, ordering the production of an individual’s user-
name and password presents the same issues as would exist if the 
court were to simply order full production of that individual’s en-
tire private social media account. Clearly, providing an adversary 
with log-in information inherently grants the requesting party full 
access to that individual’s account. However, granting requests for 
log-in information may actually give the requesting party much ful-
ler access to the account in question, as it omits the opportunity to 
redact irrelevant or privileged information. 
D. Require In Camera Review of the Individual’s Entire Facebook 
Account 
In some cases addressing discovery requests for private Face-
book account communications, courts have found that “the appro-
priate course is to remand the matter for an in camera inspection of 
the plaintiff’s Facebook records, to determine which of those 
records, if any, are relevant.”130 In Richards v. Hertz Corp., al-
though the plaintiffs had already been directed to provide the de-
fendant with copies of a specific category of photos relating to the 
claim in question, the court still required additional in camera re-
view.131 The court noted that the plaintiffs’ Facebook profile would 
likely contain content beyond photographs (“such as status re-
ports, emails, and videos that are relevant to the extent of [the 
plaintiff’s] alleged injuries”).132 Citing a need to balance the exis-
tence of such additional material with the “likely presence” of oth-
er private, yet irrelevant, material within the plaintiffs’ Facebook 
                                                                                                                            
129 Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 3366278, at *2 
(S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013). 
130 Nieves v. 30 Ellwood Realty L.L.C., 966 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808–09 (2013); see also 
Richards v. Hertz Corp, 953 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); Pereira v. City of 
N.Y., 975 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 19, 2013); Loporcaro v. City of N.Y., 950 
N.Y.S.2d 723, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 9, 2012) (“[P]laintiffs are directed to provide this 
Court with copies of plaintiff’s education, employment, pharmacy, marital counseling 
records and Facebook postings, including deleted material, in order that the Court may 
perform an in camera inspection to assess the materiality and relevance of these 
materials” (emphasis added)). 
131 See Richards, 953 N.Y.S.2d at 656–57. 
132 Id. at 656. 
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account, the court called for an in camera inspection of all content 
within the plaintiff’s Facebook account since the date of the acci-
dent at question in the claim.133 
The court offered similar reasoning in Pereira v. City of New 
York, noting that, “due to the likely presence of material of a pri-
vate nature [within the plaintiff’s social media accounts] that is not 
relevant to this action, this court shall conduct an in camera inspec-
tion of copies of all status reports, e-mails, photographs, and videos 
posted on plaintiff’s media sites since the date of the subject acci-
dent, to determine which of those materials, if any, are relevant to 
his alleged injuries.”134 In Nieves v. 30 Ellwood Realty LLC, the 
court noted that if such in camera inspection proved too burden-
some, the court reserved the discretion to “direct plaintiff to con-
duct an initial review of her own Facebook account, and limit the in 
camera inspection to items whose discoverability is contested by 
plaintiff.”135 
In at least one case, a magistrate judge suggested that he could 
create a Facebook account and become “friends” with the plain-
tiffs “for the sole purpose of reviewing photographs and related 
comments in camera . . . [The magistrate judge] would [then] 
promptly review and disseminate any relevant information to the 
parties.”136 The court in this case made such a suggestion as a 
means to expedite the discovery process.137 
Several courts have disagreed with this approach, finding it to 
be unnecessary,138 a waste of “time or resources,”139 or only per-
                                                                                                                            
133 Id. at 656–57. 
134 Pereira, 975 N.Y.S.2d at *2; see also Nieves, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (“‘[S]ince it is 
possible that not all Facebook communications are related to the events that gave rise to 
plaintiff’s cause of action,’ the appropriate course is to remand the matter for an in 
camera inspection.” (citations omitted)). 
135 Nieves, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (citations omitted). 
136 Barnes v. CUS Nashville, L.L.C., No. 3:09-cv-00764, 2010 WL 2265668, at *1 
(M.D. Tenn. June 3, 2010). 
137 See id. 
138 See Thompson v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01375-PMP-VCF, 2012 WL 
2342928, at *4 (D. Nev. June 20, 2012) (“Because Plaintiff has not claimed that the 
requested information is privileged or protected, the Court finds an in camera review of 
Plaintiff’s social networking accounts unnecessary.”). 
139 Fawcett v. Altieri, 960 N.Y.S.2d 592, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
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missible when other options have been exhausted.140 Specifically, 
Fawcett states that “asking courts to review hundreds of transmis-
sions ‘in camera’ should not be the all purpose solution to protect 
the rights of litigants. Courts do not have the time or resources to 
be the researchers for advocates seeking some tidbit of information 
that may be relevant in a . . . claim.”141 The viewpoint in Fawcett 
could be seen as the most prudent, as it appears to align most clear-
ly with the ways in which discovery is typically handled when ad-
dressing issues outside of the realm of social media. As Nieves 
points out, it only makes sense to utilize in camera review when 
there is a specific, contested issue between parties. Otherwise, it 
seems wholly unnecessary to uniquely require in camera review for 
social media discovery requests when this burden does not neces-
sarily exist for other types of discovery. 
III. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE MEANS TO FACILITATE 
DISCOVERY OF AN INDIVIDUAL’S PRIVATE SOCIAL MEDIA 
ACCOUNT? 
A. Order That the Individual Provide Adversary with a “Copy” of the 
Individual’s Account Through the “Download Your Information” 
Feature Available on Facebook 
Intertwined with issues surrounding the acceptable depth of 
social media discovery is the question of how to actually facilitate 
the production of any social media documents. There has been 
some discussion of utilizing the Download Your Information Ex-
panded Archive mechanism on Facebook as a means of facilitating 
production of an individual’s private account. This feature allows a 
user to “preserve [the entirety of] their Facebook data in electronic 
format,” so that it may be produced in a “pdf” format or in hard 
copy.142 Timothy C. Quinn comments: 
                                                                                                                            
140 See Moore v. Miller, No. 10-651, 2013 WL 2456114, at *2 (D. Col. June 6, 2013) (“In 
camera review should be employed only where no other remedy is adequate. Here, the 
Court’s standard protective order will adequately address any privacy concerns the 
parties may have.”). 
141 Fawcett, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 597–98 (emphasis in original). 
142 See Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp., No. 3:11-cv-81-RLY-WGH, 2013 WL 3366278, at 
*1–3 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2013) (Defendants requested access to the plaintiffs’ Facebook 
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A concern with this method is whether the request-
ing parties will actually receive all of the relevant 
private content from the opponent in response to 
their discovery requests. Any argument of this type 
should fail. As with all discovery requests, litigants 
have to rely on the other side to produce requested 
documents or answers to interrogatories in good 
faith. In any type of discovery request, the opposing 
party could potentially withhold requested informa-
tion. That is how discovery works. If the responding 
party fails to respond properly to a discovery re-
quest, he or she could face sanctions or penalties of 
perjury, because all responses must be “verified” by 
the responding party under penalties of perjury.143 
Another case pointed out a clear benefit of this means of pro-
duction. Although having access to an adversary’s Facebook log-in 
information would allow a requesting party to “simply [print] 
screens” from the Facebook page in question, in In re White Tail 
Oilfield Services, L.L.C., the requesting party argued that this 
“would not capture deleted data,” therefore asking the court to 
use the “‘download your information’ feature” (which keeps a 
complete record of all Facebook activity, whether deleted or 
not).144 
B. Require That the Individual Sign a Release Permitting Facebook to 
Provide the Court/Adversary with Account Information 
Although a party may not personally subpoena information 
from Facebook due to the SCA,145 a court may still require an indi-
vidual to sign a release permitting Facebook to provide the court, 
                                                                                                                            
accounts using “Facebook’s ‘download your information “Expanded Archive” 
mechanism’ to preserve their Facebook data in electronic format.” The court granted the 
defendants’ motion (although limiting the production in time), finding that the 
defendants both “made a prima facie showing that the materials sought will reasonably 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; and  . . .  [that the] privacy rights of parties 
or non-parties would [not] be violated by disclosing the information.”). 
143 Quinn, supra note 94, at 827. 
144 In re White Tail Oilfield Servs., L.L.C., No. 11-0009, 2012 WL 4857777, at *3 (E.D. 
La. Oct. 11, 2012). 
145 See cases cited supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
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or his adversary, with the contents of his private Facebook ac-
count.146 So long as the account holder, as the “originator or an 
addressee or intended recipient of [the relevant] communica-
tions,” provides lawful consent, Facebook may produce requested 
account information to a litigating party.147 Browning notes that 
“[a] properly drafted consent form should include the account 
holder or user’s name, any user ID, group ID, or known screen 
name, along with the person’s date of birth and address, including 
email address. The consent should also include—much like a well-
drafted discovery request—a detailed description of what is being 
sought.”148 This approach was taken in Beswick v. North West Medi-
cal Center, Inc. and Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., both requiring the 
plaintiff to provide the defendant with an executed consent form 
(authorizing the production of their social media account records) 
that could then be presented to Facebook or other social media 
networks.149 
C. Individual Provides Adversary with an Electronic Storage Device 
with All Information from Individual’s Social Media Account 
Thompson v. Autoliv ASP, Inc. uniquely called for the use of an 
electronic storage device as a means of producing the content of an 
individual’s social media accounts.150 The court directed the plain-
tiff to “upload onto an electronic storage device all information 
from her Facebook and MySpace accounts, from [a certain date] to 
the present.”151 In addition to providing the defendant’s counsel 
with the electronic storage device, the court directed the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                            
146 See cases cited supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
147 See Browning, supra note 6, at 475. 
148 Id. 
149 See Beswick v. N. W. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 07-020592 CACE (03), 2011 WL 7005038 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2011) (Trial Order) (“Plaintiff shall deliver to Counsel for 
Defendants a properly executed consent and authorization as may be required by the 
operators of Facebook, permitting the Defendants to gain access to Plaintiff’s Facebook 
records.”); Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) 
(“Plaintiff shall deliver to Counsel for Defendant  . . .  a properly executed consent and 
authorization as may be required by the operators of Facebook and MySpace, permitting 
said Defendant to gain access to Plaintiff’s Facebook and MySpace records, including any 
records previously deleted or archived by said operators.”). 
150 Thompson v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01375-PMP-VCF, 2012 WL 2342928, 
at *5 (D. Nev. June 20, 2012). 
151 Id. (emphasis added in original). 
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to also provide the defendant with an “index of [all] redacted social 
networking site communications.”152 Browning is a proponent of 
this approach and advocates its use by the courts. He argues: 
This approach is instructive and should be explored 
by courts confronted with requests for a party’s so-
cial media passwords (or similar unlimited access to 
all of a party’s social media content) for several rea-
sons. First, it recognizes that the scope of discovery 
into social media requires, as one court eloquently 
put it, “the application of basic discovery principles 
in a novel context,” with “the challenge [being] to 
define appropriately broad limits . . . on the discove-
rability of social communications.” It also reflects 
an understanding of the fact that the sufficiency of 
discovery responses, like beauty, is often in the eye 
of the beholder, and the lines of demarcation may be 
difficult for judges to navigate.153 
The “index” required by the court in Thompson, similar to a 
conventional privilege log, might also help to ease the strain on 
judicial resources ordinarily present by in camera review.154 
D. Appoint a Special E-Discovery Master to Oversee Electronic 
Discovery 
Finally, some courts have chosen to utilize an outside, neutral 
specialist to contend with electronic discovery requests.155 In Equal 
                                                                                                                            
152 Id. 
153 Browning, supra note 9, at 535–36 (citations omitted). 
154 Id. (“Preparation of a ‘social media index,’ somewhat akin to a privilege log, 
minimizes the burden that in camera review can represent to already limited judicial 
resources.”). 
155 See, e.g., Bro-Tech Corp. v. Thermax, Inc., No. 05-CV-2330, 2008 WL 5210346, at 
*1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008) (“Plaintiffs were permitted to conduct comprehensive 
electronic searches of certain data storage devices of the Defendants” after the court 
ordered the process to be “overseen and directed by [a] special electronic discovery 
master (‘e-discovery master’), and conducted in accordance with protocols imposed by 
the e-discovery master or reached by party stipulation—and approved by the Court in 
either event”); see also EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Ga., No. 11-cv-02560-
MSK-MEH, 2012 WL 5430974, at *2 (D. Col. Nov. 7, 2012); Perrone v. Rose City HMA, 
L.L.C., No. CI-11-14933, 2013 WL 4011622, at *1 (Trial Order) (Pa. Ct. C. P. May 3, 
2013). 
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Employment Opportunity Commission v. Original Honeybaked Ham 
Co. of Georgia, Judge Hegarty curbed attempts at unfettered access 
to a party’s private Facebook account instructing a “special master 
[to] compile the text messages and postings on Facebook and other 
pages, determine what was and was not relevant, and then give 
plaintiffs an opportunity to object before the content was pro-
duced.”156 The approach has become an increasingly popular way 
for courts to handle social media discovery disputes.157 This may 
include requiring the parties themselves to hire such a “special 
master,” as the court did in Perrone v. Rose City HMA, L.L.C., a 
Pennsylvania premises liability case.158 In Perrone, the judge or-
dered that the parties were to: 
Hire a “neutral forensic computer expert” to re-
view the plaintiffs’ privacy-restricted Facebook ac-
count for a seventeen-day period relevant to the 
person injury claims in the case . . . [The judge] di-
rected that the neutral expert be given plaintiff’s us-
er names and password information in order to 
access the account, download the account contents 
to a hard drive, and identify and isolate “all photo-
graphs of snow and references to snow in any emails 
and any photographs of the Plaintiff . . . engaged in 
any physical activity.” Copies of the files would 
then be provided to counsel, and the costs of the 
neutral expert would be assessed against the defen-
dants.159 
This approach may offer one means of curbing some of the is-
sues that arise when it seems that the entirety of an individual’s 
Facebook account would be relevant. Furthermore, using a special 
“e-discovery master” offers some of the same inherent benefits of 
in camera review, without placing the burden on the court itself. 
Still, this forces us to ask why these types of requests would neces-
sarily require this type of in-depth, neutral analysis, when such 
                                                                                                                            
156 See Browning, supra note 9, at 516. 
157 See id. at n.54. 
158 Perrone, 2013 WL 4011622, at *1. 
159 Browning, supra note 9, at n.54 (citations omitted). 
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precautions are not required to be taken with other non-social me-
dia discovery requests. 
IV. RESOLUTION: DO NOT TREAT SOCIAL MEDIA 
DISCOVERY ANY DIFFERENTLY THAN ANY OTHER 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
A. Social Media Discovery Requests Should Not Uniquely Require a 
Different Means of Facilitation, Production, or Judicial Assistance 
The conflicts of law articulated throughout this note must lead 
us to question what in fact the appropriate depth of social media 
discovery is, and how to facilitate such discovery. The fact that 
courts have been unable to conclusively agree on a method for ap-
proaching social media discovery requests suggests that such re-
quests are often viewed as unique. However, “[t]o the extent so-
cial-media discovery presents challenges the existing discovery sys-
tem cannot adequately deal with,” those challenges are not in fact 
unique to social media requests specifically.160 It therefore appears 
that the best “solution” for appropriately handling social media 
discovery requests is actually to treat these requests no differently 
than any other types of discovery. 
In the social media context, requesting parties appear to have 
an increased concern that their adversaries will fail to provide them 
with all relevant and responsive information. However, this con-
cern is misplaced. There is no reason to suggest that counsel has 
any less of an obligation to provide adversaries with documents 
that are responsive to a well-tailored discovery request simply be-
cause the documents requested include digital communications 
potentially shielded by a social networking site’s privacy settings. 
The court highlighted this sentiment in Simply Storage, stating that 
“lawyers are frequently called upon to make judgment calls—in 
good faith and consistent with their obligations as officers of the 
court—about what information is responsive to another party’s 
discovery requests.”161 The court noted that, should parties believe 
                                                                                                                            
160 Steven S. Gensler, Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 ARK. L. REV. 7, 11 
(2012). 
161 EEOC v. Simply Storage Mgmt., LLC, 270 F.R.D. 430, 436 (S.D. Ind. 2010). 
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that the other side failed to produce a full set of discovery docu-
ments, there are options available and procedures already set in 
place to provide for dealing with such shortcomings.162 Most nota-
bly, “a refusal by a plaintiff to produce relevant and discoverable 
content could be grounds for imposing sanctions.”163 Quinn ex-
plains: 
[A]n interested party cannot be the “final arbiter” 
of relevance. But counsel for the producing party is 
the judge of relevance in the first interest. Discovery 
in our adversarial system is based on a good faith re-
sponse to demands for production by an attorney 
constrained by the Federal Rules and by ethical ob-
ligations. Where the parties disagree as to the con-
tours of relevance in connection with particular dis-
covery demands, they present their dispute to the 
court . . . When a party can demonstrate that an ad-
versary may be wrongfully withholding relevant in-
formation, it can seek relief . . . .164 
Ultimately, there is no reason that parties should require any 
particular judicial assistance in order to decide which information 
contained within an individual’s Facebook account is responsive to 
a discovery request.165 This means, first and foremost, that a court 
                                                                                                                            
162 See Quinn, supra note 94, at 827. 
163 Id. (citing Mackelprang v. Fid. Nat’l Title Agency of Nev., Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00788-
JCM-GWF, 2007 WL 119149, at *8 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007)) 
164 Id. at 828 (citing Rozell v. Ross-Holst, No. 05 Civ. 2936(JGK) (JCF), 2006 WL 
163143, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2006)). 
165 See Offenback v. L.M. Bowman, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1789, 2011 WL 2491371, n.3 
(M.D. Pa. June 22, 2011). (“[W]e express some confusion about why the parties required 
the Court’s assistance in deciding what information within Plaintiff’s Facebook account is 
responsive to Defendants’ discovery requests and therefore properly discoverable. 
Although Defendants have taken a broad view of the potential relevance of Plaintiff’s 
Facebook account, Plaintiffs do not appear to have argued that the information in the 
bulleted paragraphs above should be protected from disclosure in this lawsuit. It is thus 
unclear why the Court was called upon to conduct an initial review of Plaintiff’s entire 
Facebook account to determine whether it contained potentially responsive, non-
privileged information that should be produced as part of discovery in this case. Given 
that the Plaintiff is the party with the greatest familiarity with his own Facebook account, 
we submit that it would have been appropriate and substantially more efficient for 
Plaintiff to have conducted this initial review and then, if he deemed it warranted, to 
object to disclosure of some or all of the potentially responsive information included in his 
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should not be asked to intervene to conduct an initial review of an 
individual’s entire Facebook account (private or otherwise).166 Re-
questing this type of judicial intervention is, essentially, requesting 
that the court do the job of the counsel for the responding party. 
This also suggests that counsel for the requesting party has some 
misplaced belief that the other party is somehow less capable of 
adequately responding to a discovery request when private social 
media is involved. 
In Offenback, the court expressed “some confusion” about why 
the parties required the court’s assistance at all.167 Magistrate 
Judge Martin C. Carlson stated, “[g]iven that the Plaintiff is the 
party with the greatest familiarity with his own Facebook account, 
we submit that it would have been appropriate and substantially 
more efficient for Plaintiff to have conducted this initial review and 
then, if he deemed it warranted, to object to disclosure of some or 
all of the potentially responsive information included in his ac-
count.”168 
B. Discovery Requests Should Be Drafted in a Way to Be Wholly 
Inclusive of All Social Media, Such That the Means of 
Facilitation/Production Becomes Irrelevant 
In order to best ensure that counsel is able to produce relevant, 
potentially admissible documents, discovery requests must merely 
be drafted in a way that is both inclusive of all forms of social media 
                                                                                                                            
account. The Court recognizes that the scope of discovery into social media sites 
‘requires the application of basic discovery principles in a novel context,’ and that the 
challenge is to ‘define appropriately broad limits . . . on the discovery ability of social 
communications.’ However, in this case it appears that Defendants backed away from 
their initial position that they should be entitled to a general release of all information and 
data from Plaintiff’s social networking sites, and that instead of engaging in a broad 
fishing expedition, were attempting to discover potentially relevant information such as 
that described in their May 2, 2011, letter to the Court. If Defendants had, in fact, 
narrowed their discovery requests in this fashion, we believe it would have been both 
possible and proper for Plaintiff to have undertaken the initial review of his Facebook 
account to determine whether it contained potentially relevant and responsive 
information, and thereafter to solicit the Court’s assistance if a dispute remained as to 
whether he should be required to produce the information identified.” (citations 
omitted)). 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 Id. 
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and also specifies a narrowly tailored area of requested content. Es-
sentially, this is treating social media discovery requests in a way 
that is no different than other discovery requests. Most notably, 
this will still yield the same, if not better, results. This resonated 
with the Offenback court, which stated that, if the defendants had 
narrowed their discovery request, rather than “engaging in a broad 
fishing expedition,” 
it would have been both possible and proper for 
Plaintiff to have undertaken the initial review of his 
Facebook account to determine whether it con-
tained potentially relevant and responsive informa-
tion, and thereafter to solicit the Court’s assistance 
[only] if a dispute remained as to whether he should 
be required to produce the information identified.169 
This approach requires only that the rules that govern the dis-
covery of information held in hard copy similarly apply to the con-
tent of electronic communications from social media sites.170 The 
court prescribed this in Howell, stating: 
Defendants are free to serve interrogatories and 
document requests that seek information from the 
accounts that is relevant to the claims and defenses 
in this lawsuit. Plaintiff’s counsel can then access 
the private sections of Howell’s social media ac-
counts and provide the information and documents 
responsive to the discovery requests.171 
Accordingly, all discovery requests that seek to collect evidence 
from social media sites should be specified to closely relate to the 
litigation at hand.172 
In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center is an example of one case 
in which the court treated a social media discovery request no dif-
                                                                                                                            
169 Id. 
170 See, e.g., Howell v. Buckeye Ranch, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-1014, 2012 WL 5265170, at *1 
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 1, 2012) (“The same rules that govern the discovery of information in 
hard copy documents apply to electronic files.”). 
171 Id. 
172 See Gregory, supra note 1, at 451 (“A discovery request to garner evidence from 
social media sources should, therefore, be particularized as much as possible to the claim 
or defense at issue in order to pass judicial scrutiny.”). 
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ferently than any other type of discovery request.173 The defendant 
requested the production of all electronic communications during a 
certain time period, “including social media accounts, emails, text 
messages, and instant messages,” that may have related to the 
plaintiff’s domicile on the date of the crash in question.174 The 
court’s ruling stated only that the “[p]laintiff shall produce res-
ponsive documents as ordered herein within 30 days of the entry 
date of this decision.”175 This request was narrowly tailored such 
that judicial intervention was not required to either determine the 
relevancy of potential documents, or to determine the means of 
production. 
Additionally, if courts apply the same discovery standards to 
social media discovery requests as they do to requests for all other 
types of documents, there will no longer be a need for courts to 
conduct a separate “relevance” inquiry. A court will not need to 
determine whether the requesting party has provided evidence of 
“relevant” information on an individual’s public Facebook page, 
such that a court may permit discovery of that individual’s private 
Facebook account. The relevance inquiry176 appears only necessary 
in contexts where a defendant is, for example, requesting the entire 
(or nearly entire) contents of a plaintiff’s private Facebook or social 
media account. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure177 
do not actually “require a party prove the existence of relevant ma-
terial before requesting it.”178 Therefore, as noted in Giacchetto, 
this relevance inquiry has the danger of “improperly shield[ing] 
from discovery”179 information that should otherwise be discover-
able. If we require relevance to be proved by showing that informa-
tion relating to the claims in question exists on some part of the 
public profile of the party in question, we may inadvertently pro-
tect items from discovery merely because the social media account 
has a well-protected public profile. However, a proper, narrowly 
                                                                                                                            
173 See In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., N.Y. on Feb. 12, 2009, Nos. 09-MD-2085, 
09-CV-961 S, 2011 WL 6370189, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2011). 
174 Id. at *5. 
175 Id. at *7. 
176 See supra notes 30–34. 
177 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); supra note 34. 
178 See supra note 34. 
179 Id. 
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tailored social media discovery request (that would be handled by 
the court no differently than any other request), would, by default, 
skip such an inquiry, leading instead directly to the production of 
all pertinent and discoverable content. 
Finally, this approach makes many considerations about how to 
determine the depth of discovery and the means of discovery pro-
duction moot. First, an individual would never be required to pro-
vide a requesting party with his username and password180 because 
the burden would be placed upon the responding individual instead 
to simply produce only the responsive material in whatever form is 
reasonable. Because the entire content of an individual’s private 
Facebook account would not likely be part of a narrowly tailored 
discovery request, it would be unnecessarily broad to provide an 
adversary with account log-in information. Similarly, in camera re-
view181 would become applicable only in contexts in which the par-
ties were unable to agree about what content should be discovera-
ble. Although the Download Your Information182 feature available 
on Facebook may prove useful when producing documents, it 
would not necessarily be required. Because this feature provides 
the account holder with an electronic copy (“pdf”) of everything 
that is contained in an account, it could prove to be a useful way for 
a responding party to conduct an initial review of the content of his 
account. Then, whichever content is deemed responsive could ac-
tually be taken from this pdf, with redactions as applicable. This 
same reasoning would also hold true for the use of special e-
discovery masters.183 While such “masters” may be of use in re-
solving actual disputes about the discoverable content of social me-
dia, if all discovery requests are narrowly tailored to actually relate 
to the litigation and claims at hand, there should be no need to util-
ize these “masters” to conduct any type of initial review to assist 
in determining which content is responsive. 
The court would also not need to, in ordinary circumstances, 
direct an individual to sign a release permitting Facebook to pro-
                                                                                                                            
180 See supra notes 120–129. 
181 See supra notes 130–41. 
182 See supra notes 142–44. 
183 See supra notes 161–64. 
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vide the court or his adversary with account content.184 With the 
approach described herein as the new standard, a responding party 
would have the burden to review all social media accounts (wheth-
er they are private or not) for any potentially responsive content. 
Because an individual would already have access to his own ac-
count information, there would be no reason to request account 
content from Facebook. A release would, therefore, only be re-
quired if a responding party refused to comply with a valid discov-
ery request or if there were reason to believe that the account hold-
er had deleted potentially responsive information that could only 
be retrieved by Facebook. Finally, an electronic storage device185 
could potentially be a useful means of production but should not by 
any means be the sole means of production for social media discov-
ery requests. An electronic storage device could be helpful if the 
responsive material is so voluminous that it would not be reasona-
ble to turn over discovery in hard copy (or by any other requested 
means); however, there would be no reason to insist on this me-
thod, given that the entirety of an individual’s account would not 
need to somehow be transferred to an adversarial party (or to the 
court). 
Furthermore, there is also no reason to draft new or unique so-
cial media discovery rules, either governing the depth of discovery 
or the means of document production. It is clear that social media 
discovery requests are able to fit within the current framework of 
discovery rules;186 therefore, “any effort to draft special rules for 
social-media discovery would probably ask more of the current 
rulemaking process than it can deliver.”187 In light of the existence 
of exponentially increasing technology, any social media discovery 
rules created today would likely seem entirely antiquated even a 
decade from now.188 Therefore, the answer should not just be to 
                                                                                                                            
184 See supra notes 146–49. 
185 See supra notes 155–59. 
186 Gensler, supra note 160, at 10 (“Not only do I think social-media discovery fits easily 
into the existing discovery scheme, I think judges have, for the most part, already figured 
out how to fit it in.”). 
187 Id. at 38. 
188 Id. (“‘Facebook’ discovery rules written today would probably look archaic, if not 
silly, ten years from now. Young lawyers then might even laugh at them—probably using 
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stick with the status quo, but rather to truly embrace the proce-
dures that have already worked for the judicial system for so many 
years. It seems likely that many of the more troubling cases that 
permitted extremely broad discovery (and the full production of 
private social media accounts) would have been better resolved had 
these courts seen the “documentation” in question for what it real-
ly was—content that, legally speaking, presented no different chal-
lenges than giant stacks of papers from a room full of filing cabi-
nets.189 Although one can infer that the courts of Beswick or Bass 
reached the conclusions that they did in part due to a lack of fami-
liarity with social media or a general sentiment that new media 
should require new rules, any of these arguably old-fashioned ideas 
are misplaced. Ultimately, so long as courts work within the cur-
rent framework of discovery rules, the judicial system would not 
only benefit by proceeding with one, unified approach to social me-
dia discovery requests, but it would also allow litigating parties to 
have a fuller picture of what to expect from courts and adversaries 
regarding the discovery of private social media accounts. 
 
                                                                                                                            
some new mode of communication that I cannot now fathom and will likely never learn to 
use.”). 
189 See supra note 55. 
